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prior to the advent of the home computer—that supplement the Fourth
Amendment to regulate government access to information. The Privacy
Protection Act of 1980 is one such statute, though few understand or utilize
its protections. The Act prohibits law enforcement officials from searching
for or seizing information from people who disseminate information to the
public, such as reporters. Where it applies, the Act requires law
enforcement officials to instead rely on compliance with a subpoena or the
target’s voluntary cooperation to gain access to information. While the Act
clearly protects the press, its text reaches more broadly. Changes that have
occurred in the information industry since the Act’s passage underscore
ambiguities in who and what it now protects. To revive its original privacy
and speech protections, this Note advocates a reading of the Act to leverage
its clear text to protect the privacy, speech, and business interests of
information disseminators. Alternatively, compelling interest requirements
for searches and ex ante procedural protections would protect similar
privacy, speech, and business-continuity interests relevant to all sectors of
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INTRODUCTION
The federal privacy legislative scheme is a notoriously fragmented
patchwork of aging sector-specific statutes.1 Where privacy interests
intersect with criminal law enforcement, privacy statutes supplement the
Fourth Amendment to regulate government access to information. Public
interest campaigns have exhorted Congress to enact comprehensive
information privacy rules2 and update key statutes such as the Electronic

1

See, e.g., Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Reunifying Privacy Law, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 2007, 2008 (2010)
(calling federal privacy law “fragmented”). Different statutory regimes govern privacy in health
information, financial data, children’s information, and government information regulation. See
generally DANIEL J. SOLOVE & PAUL M. SCHWARTZ, PRIVACY LAW FUNDAMENTALS (2d ed. 2013)
(summarizing privacy law governing sectors that deal categorically with government records, health
information and genetic information, financial information, business data, educational records, and
employment information). The various schemes do not even share common vocabulary or standards.
See Paul M. Schwartz & Daniel J. Solove, The PII Problem: Privacy and a New Concept of Personally
Identifiable Information, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1814, 1816 (2011) (“Given [personally identifiable
information]’s importance, it is surprising that information privacy law in the United States lacks a
uniform definition of the term.”).
2
See generally Paul M. Schwartz, Preemption and Privacy, 118 YALE L.J. 902 (2009) (criticizing
the demand for comprehensive privacy legislation instead of sector-specific laws); Patricia L. Bellia,
Federalization in Information Privacy Law, 118 YALE L.J. 868 (2009) (responding to Professor
Schwartz).
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Communications Privacy Act.3 In the meantime, decades-old statutes
passed prior to the advent of the home computer govern information
privacy and compelled disclosure.
The Privacy Protection Act of 19804 is an example of one such privacy
statute. The Act prohibits law enforcement officials from searching for or
seizing information from people who disseminate information to the public.
Where it applies, the Act requires law enforcement officials to instead rely
on compliance with a subpoena duces tecum5 or the target’s voluntary
cooperation to gain access to information from reporters and others
engaged in information dissemination.6
Congress enacted the Privacy Protection Act of 1980 as a response to
an unpopular Supreme Court decision stemming from a controversial
newsroom search at Stanford University.7 As a result, the Act clearly
protects the press, but its text reaches more broadly.8 Since 1980, the pool
of those potentially covered by the Act has increased dramatically as a
result of changes in the information industry. As early as 1998, one Justice
Department attorney acknowledged these changes.9 He stated that Congress
did not anticipate the “explosive grow[th] of the computer world,” and that
given the dramatic expansion of digital publishing and home computer
usage, the Act might now in fact protect any person who publishes online.10
As that Justice Department attorney indicated, Congress did not
deliberate over the Act with our modern information landscape in mind. As
a result, three important aspects of the Act lack clarity: (1) what people it
protects, (2) how the statutory classifications should be applied to digital
content, and (3) what interests it protects. As to the first ambiguity, the Act
can be construed to protect any individual intending to communicate to the

3

See, e.g., NOT WITHOUT A WARRANT, http://notwithoutawarrant.com (last visited May 25, 2013)
(“The government should be required to go to a judge and get a warrant before it can read our email,
access private photographs and documents we store online, or track our location using our mobile
phones. Please support legislation that would update the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of
1986 (ECPA) to require warrants for this sensitive information and to require the government to report
publicly on the use of its surveillance powers.”).
4
Pub. L. No. 96-440, 94 Stat. 1879 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000aa to 2000aa-12
(2006)).
5
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1563 (9th ed. 2009) defines a subpoena duces tecum as “[a] subpoena
ordering the witness to appear in court and to bring specified documents, records, or things.”
6
See § 2000aa(b)(3).
7
See Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978).
8
See § 2000aa(a) (“[I]t shall be unlawful . . . to search for or seize any work product materials
possessed by a person reasonably believed to have a purpose to disseminate to the public a newspaper,
book, broadcast, or other similar form of public communication, in or affecting interstate or foreign
commerce . . . .”).
9
See Mark Eckenwiler, Applications of the Privacy Protection Act, 8 SETON HALL CONST. L.J.
725, 729 (1998).
10
Id.
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public or some narrower subset of actors.11 A textual reading of the Act
reaches broadly, but the Act’s muddled origins as a “First Amendment bill”
and the realities of law enforcement searches and seizures of increasingly
technology-intensive environments beg consideration of borderline cases.
As to the second ambiguity, how the statutory classifications apply to
digital content is unclear in two ways. First, it is uncertain what digital
materials constitute the “work product” and “documentary materials” that
fall within the purview of the Act,12 particularly outside a traditional press
context. In a press context, work product connotes some contribution from
a reporter, such as a draft article or personal notes reflecting mental
impressions. Documentary materials signify material collected in
preparation for distribution, absent something extra from the reporter’s
thoughts. Outside a traditional press context, such as in the realm of a
blogger or a person who serves content to the public via mobile
applications, the question of what material falls into each category is less
clear. Nevertheless, the distinction matters: the statute offers different
levels of protection to each category. Second, it is uncertain how
commingled protected and unprotected digital materials should be treated.
It is not clear whether the Act protects individual electronic files or the
entire discs and computer servers that contain those files.13 Where a server
hosts many websites, whether the Act protects it from seizure may be the
determining factor in whether a whole suite of services goes dark. One
server seizure could result in many otherwise unrelated websites going
offline, implicating the operational continuity of those businesses.
Finally, the third ambiguity involves what interests the Act protects. It
can variously be characterized as protecting privacy, free speech, the press,
or the operational continuity of those individuals and businesses who
provide information services. Additionally, it could be limited to protecting
the interests of just those people in possession of the materials sought by
law enforcement, or it could protect others whose personal information is
implicated by the nature of the materials.
This Note tracks two archetypical examples of people whose
technological activity underscores the problems posed by the Act’s
ambiguities: bloggers and smartphone application developers (app
developers). Bloggers distribute information to the public, though to some,
11

Compare Edward Fenno, Federal Internet Privacy Law, S.C. LAW., Jan./Feb. 2001, at 32, 36
(“[I]t appears facially that nearly everyone posting messages on the Internet or with online services is
covered by the Act.”), with Viktor Mayer-Schönberger, Beyond Privacy, Beyond Rights—Toward a
“Systems” Theory of Information Governance, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1853, 1858 & n.22 (2010) (citing the
Act as protecting “sector-specific information privacy rights”).
12
See § 2000aa.
13
Documentary materials are defined by the text of § 2000aa-7(a) as “materials upon which
information is recorded,” including “electronically recorded cards, tapes, or discs,” but they have also
been defined somewhat atextually by courts. See, e.g., Guest v. Leis, 255 F.3d 325, 342 (6th Cir. 2001)
(analyzing “materials” at the level of the file rather than the disc containing such files).
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the idea of an at-home blogger does not align with traditional notions of the
press that originally prompted enactment.14 App developers also distribute
information to the public by delivering pocket-sized services related to
many topics, such as weather, finance, and gaming. While they do not
necessarily gather source material from confidential sources as do the
prototypical reporters who prompted the Act, app developers collect
comparably private information about their customers’ information
consumption.15 They also provide information infrastructure by which
content is delivered to the public, whether via websites, smartphones,
tablets, or other mechanisms of the app economy.
If an entire computer or server can be seized without notice, it could
threaten the operational continuity of the blogger or app developer. That is,
the seizure of a whole server could interrupt the continuous operation of the
websites and business operations dependent upon it. Seizure of a server can
cause outages of seemingly unrelated services, such as occurred in a recent
Federal Bureau of Investigation raid that knocked offline more than 300 email accounts, dozens of e-mail lists, and multiple websites—none of
which were alleged to be involved in the anonymous bomb threats that
prompted the raid.16 The Act’s protections could be negated altogether in
these situations if these statutory ambiguities are not sufficiently resolved.

14

The “press” is notoriously difficult to define, and the question has generated exhaustive literature
outside the scope of this Note. See, e.g., David A. Anderson, Freedom of the Press, 80 TEX. L. REV.
429, 435–46 (2002) (discussing the difficulties inherent in defining the press and various proposed
solutions); Sonja R. West, Awakening the Press Clause, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1025, 1047–70 (2011)
(counseling against an overbroad definition of the press and proposing several interpretations to allow
the Press Clause “to attain its textual and functional potential”).
15
For instance, apps often collect information about what a person searches for and how long they
view a particular page. The information enables and incentivizes providers to “create profiles about
individuals, their interests and concerns, and even those of their family and friends.” ACLU OF N. CAL.,
DIGITAL BOOKS: A NEW CHAPTER FOR READER PRIVACY 4 (2010), available at http://www.aclunc.org/
issues/technology/asset_upload_file295_9047.pdf. Website providers collect similar information, so
analysis that applies to app developers who host information services also applies to many website
providers. See, e.g., Google Book Search Hearing—The Time Has Come to Protect Reader Privacy,
ACLU OF N. CAL., http://www.aclunc.org/issues/technology/blog/google_book_search_hearing-_the_
time_has_come_to_protect_reader_privacy.shtml (last visited May 25, 2013).
16
See Press Release, Riseup.net, Server Seizure, Apr. 2012, available at https://help.riseup.net/en/
seizure-2012-april (“Disrupted in this seizure were academics, artists, historians, feminist groups, gay
rights groups, community centers, documentation and software archives and free speech groups. The
server included the mailing list ‘cyber rights’ (the oldest discussion list in Italy to discuss this topic), a
Mexican migrant solidarity group, and other groups working to support indigenous groups and workers
in Latin America, the Caribbean and Africa. In total, over 300 email accounts, between 50–80 email
lists, and several other websites have been taken off the Internet by this action. None are alleged to be
involved in the anonymous bomb threats.”); see also Verne G. Kopytoff, F.B.I. Seizes Web Servers,
Knocking Sites Offline, N.Y. TIMES BITS BLOG (June 21, 2011, 5:54 PM), http://
bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/06/21/f-b-i-seizes-web-servers-knocking-sites-offline (detailing the FBI
raid and the impact on the data center’s clients); Paul G. Madison, Server Seizer Leads to Unwanted
Consequences, DC METROPOLITAN BUS. L. ALERT (June 23, 2011), http://www.dcbusinesslawalert.
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This Note offers an interpretation of the Act that remedies these
uncertainties for law enforcement going forward. After introducing the
circumstances that led to the passage of the Act, Part I details the
requirements of its text and interpretations in subsequent case law.17 Part II
then briefly explains trends that have transformed the information industry
since the passage of the Act. Against this backdrop, Part III introduces
Professor Daniel Solove’s theory of the First Amendment as an
independent source of constitutional criminal procedure that protects
expressive and associational activity from government information
gathering. Using Solove’s framework and the Act’s text and history, Part
III goes on to first propose and then critique a broad textual interpretation
of the Act that resolves the three ambiguities enumerated above. With these
critiques in mind, Part IV introduces alternative mechanisms to protect the
interests implicated by the Act.
HISTORY AND PASSAGE OF THE PRIVACY PROTECTION ACT OF 1980
Congress enacted the Privacy Protection Act18 out of concern over the
intrusiveness of law enforcement searching and seizing materials in the
press’s possession. Initially framed as a First Amendment bill, the Act’s
text grew to encompass broad—and ill-defined—protections against
compelled information disclosure.
I.

A. The Legislative Response to Zurcher v. Stanford Daily
The Privacy Protection Act was Congress’s response to the Supreme
Court’s 1978 ruling in Zurcher v. Stanford Daily.19 Zurcher arose after The
Stanford Daily published photographs of a violent clash between police and
demonstrators. The demonstrators were protesting at the administrative
offices of the Stanford University Hospital in response to the racially
motivated firing of a janitor.20 Authorities acquired a search warrant to
search The Stanford Daily offices on the belief that the student newspaper
possessed photographs of an assault on police officers that occurred during
the demonstrations.21

com/local-news/server-seizer-leads-to-unwanted-consequences (discussing the negative repercussions
for websites on the same server as those seized).
17
Judicial and scholarly interpretations of the Act are few and far between. Cf. Eckenwiler, supra
note 9 (“[T]here’s very little . . . surprisingly little case law [interpreting the Act] considering it’s a
statute that’s more than seventeen years old.” (alteration in original)). The Act has now ticked past its
thirtieth birthday without much change in the literature.
18
Pub. L. No. 96-440, 94 Stat. 1879 (1980) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000aa to
2000aa-12 (2006)).
19
436 U.S. 547 (1978).
20
See Dwight L. Teeter, Jr. & S. Griffin Singer, Search Warrants in Newsrooms: Some Aspects of
the Impact of Zurcher v. The Stanford Daily, 67 KY. L.J. 847, 849 (1979).
21
Zurcher, 436 U.S. at 550–51.
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The newspaper successfully challenged the search in the district and
circuit courts on the grounds that the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments
forbade use of a warrant to search for materials in the possession of a
nonsuspect without probable cause to believe that a subpoena would be
impracticable.22 Reversing the Ninth Circuit, the Supreme Court then held
that the Fourth Amendment does not prevent a state from issuing a warrant
just because the person to be searched is not suspected of a crime.23
Specifically, the Court rejected the suggestion that the Fourth Amendment
limits the government to using a subpoena duces tecum in such “third-party
search” situations. The Court was not swayed by the fact that the search of
a newspaper implicates the First Amendment.24 Instead, the Court indicated
that timely publication of the news and confidentiality of sources would be
adequately protected by the requirements of a warrant application.25
The Court’s decision thus failed to protect the press from the
immediate intrusion of a break-down-the-door search and operational
interruption caused by sudden seizure of materials. After the ruling, public
outcry demanded protection against such abrupt intrusions.26 President
Carter directed the Justice Department to study the issues raised by Zurcher
and assess the viability of a legislative solution.27 The eventual solution
took two years to enact, during which Congress first considered enacting
broad protection for any nonsuspect third parties.28 Rejecting that broad
approach, Congress instead settled on protecting just those people engaged
in public communication.29
22

See Stanford Daily v. Zurcher, 353 F. Supp. 124 (N.D. Cal. 1972) (citing the Fourth Amendment
to rule the search of a nonsuspect unconstitutional without probable cause to believe a subpoena duces
tecum would be impractical), aff’d, 550 F.2d 464 (9th Cir. 1977), rev’d, 436 U.S. 547.
23
Zurcher, 436 U.S. at 547, 554, 559.
24
Id. at 565–66.
25
Id. at 566.
26
For a summary of the responses of major American newspapers, including responses from the
Washington Post, Boston Globe, New York Times, and Wall Street Journal, see Teeter & Singer, supra
note 20, at 854–57.
27
See Privacy Protection Act: Hearing on S. 115, S. 1790, and S. 1816 Before the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 96th Cong. 50 (1980) [hereinafter Privacy Protection Act Hearing] (prepared statement of
Philip B. Heymann, Assistant Att’y Gen. of the United States).
28
See Susan K. Erburu, Note, Zurcher v. Stanford Daily: The Legislative Debate, 17 HARV. J. ON
LEGIS. 152, 165–73 (1980) (contrasting “press-only” and “third-party” bills considered by the Ninetysixth Congress); see also Privacy Protection Act Hearing, supra note 27, at 59 (prepared statement of
Philip B. Heymann, Assistant Att’y Gen. of the United States) (stating that it is “not safe to assume”
that a nonsuspect third party will comply with a subpoena because they will likely have a relationship
making them loyal to, controlled, or influenced by a suspect, unless the third party is an “institutional
record holder[]”); Citizens Privacy Protection Act: Hearings on S. 3162 and S. 3164 Before the
Subcomm. on the Constitution of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong. 1–3 (1979) (statement of
Sen. Birch Bayh) (introducing hearings on a previous bill proposed in response to Zurcher that would
have protected against searches of materials “in possession of a person not implicated in criminal
activity”).
29
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa (2006).
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The form and scope of the Act’s protections underwent multiple
iterations. Notably, an early bill would have prohibited searches and
seizures for documentary materials of those “engaged in first amendment
activities.”30 The House subsequently deleted the phrase; the legislative
history indicates that the change was borne of the ambiguous boundaries of
the category “first amendment activities.”31 The edit foreshadowed what
would become persistent confusion over the scope of protection afforded
by the Act. Despite the change, Department of Justice officials supporting
the bill clearly understood it as a “first amendment bill.”32 As Assistant
Attorney General Philip Heymann testified, the Department still envisioned
the bill to be “as broad as the first amendment, broader than [the] press or
anything thought of as organized press,” reaching “all first amendment
rights,” including “people who will never succeed in publishing, and those
who publish every day.”33
B. Requirements of the Act
As enacted, Subchapter I34 of the Act institutes a general “no-search”
rule protecting certain people.35 Specifically, the Act prohibits law
enforcement from searching materials in the possession of people who have
“a purpose to disseminate to the public a newspaper, book, broadcast, or
other similar form of public communication.”36 Key to this portion of the
Act is a person’s intention to disseminate some form of “public
communication.” While this language clearly encompasses reporters, the
legislative history suggests that “academicians, authors, filmmakers, and

30

See S. REP. NO. 96-1003, at 7 (1980) (Conf. Rep.) (discussing the House amendment to change
the title of S. 1790).
31
See id. The “press” is similarly difficult to define. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
32
See Privacy Protection Act Hearing, supra note 27, at 33 (testimony of Philip B. Heymann,
Assistant Att’y Gen. of the United States); see also id. at 44 (“If it is work product, we say, ‘First
amendment wins.’ It will be a while before you hear us saying that again.”).
33
Id. at 32–33.
34
§ 2000aa. Subchapter II of the Act directs the Attorney General to issue guidelines governing
how federal officers and investigators should obtain documentary materials possessed by third parties
who are not suspects. Id. § 2000aa-11. The guidelines address the personal privacy interests of the
person in possession of the materials, a requirement that the least intrusive method of obtaining the
documents be used, a recognition of the special privacy interests posed by privileged relationships, and
a warrant approval process. 28 C.F.R. §§ 59.1–.6 (2012).
35
Some refer to Subchapter I of the Act as establishing a “subpoena-first” rule. See Jose M.
Sariego, Note, The Privacy Protection Act of 1980: Curbing Unrestricted Third-Party Searches in the
Wake of Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 14 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 519, 540–41 (1981). Sariego correctly
notes that “any mechanism by which the party to be searched is notified of the impending search and
allowed to object, including but not limited to subpoenas duces tecum, suffices to escape the Act’s
requirements.” Id. at 541. To avoid making a narrower inference than the text demands, this Note uses
the “no-search” rule label.
36
§ 2000aa(a).
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free lance [sic] writers and photographers” are also protected.37 The
purpose of the resultant protection has been characterized as defending the
flow of information to the public.38
The Act protects only certain materials from search and seizure: “work
product” and “documentary materials.”39 Work product is defined as
materials prepared “in anticipation of communicating such materials to the
public,” including “mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or theories”
of the material’s creator.40 Documentary materials are defined to include
“photographs, . . . films, negatives, video tapes, audio tapes, and other
mechanically, magentically [sic] or electronically recorded cards, tapes, or
discs.”41 Neither work product nor documentary materials include
“contraband or the fruits of a crime.”42
Protection for each category of materials is subject to a complex set of
exceptions and sub-exceptions.43 Protection for work product, tied to the
creator’s mental process, is subject to just two exceptions.44 The first
“suspect” exception allows a search or seizure when the person in
possession of the relevant materials is a suspect in the crime under
investigation.45 However, if the crime is the receipt or possession of the
materials sought, the suspect exception does not apply unless the materials
relate to national defense, classified information, or the sexual exploitation
of children.46 The second exception applies when immediate seizure is
“necessary to prevent the death of, or serious bodily injury to, a human
being.”47 The strong protection afforded work product (compared to that for
documentary materials) may be due to the special regard Congress gave
reporters’ mental process.
Protection against search and seizure of documentary materials is
subject to four exceptions.48 The first two exceptions are identical to those
the Act provides for work product.49 Additionally, searches for
37

H.R. REP. NO. 96-1064, at 5 (1980).
See Sariego, supra note 35, at 535.
39
§ 2000aa.
40
Id. § 2000aa-7(b).
41
Id. § 2000aa-7(a) (footnote omitted).
42
See id. § 2000aa-7(a), (b). Congress did not anticipate that documentary materials would often
fall into this category. See S. REP. NO. 96-874, at 16 (1980) (“These traditional categories of things
which are properly subjects for search are in a vast majority of instances not documentary materials, but
rather money, guns, weapons, narcotics, etc.”).
43
For a plain-language explanation of the exceptions, sub-exceptions, and sub-sub-exceptions, see
Eckenwiler, supra note 9, at 728.
44
See Sariego, supra note 35, at 544 (citing S. REP. NO. 96-874, at 10).
45
§ 2000aa(a)(1).
46
Id.
47
Id. § 2000aa(a)(2).
48
Id. § 2000aa(b).
49
Id.
38
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documentary materials are allowed in two other situations. First,
documentary materials may be seized pursuant to a warrant when there is
reason to believe that giving notice would result in the “destruction,
alteration, or concealment” of the materials.50 This exception is justified:
the Act’s purpose was to control how law enforcement officials obtained
access to documentary materials, not to prevent their access altogether.51
Second, documentary materials may be seized when they have not been
produced in response to a court order after appellate remedies have been
exhausted or there is reason to believe that delay would “threaten the
interests of justice.”52
The Act creates a civil cause of action for damages to enforce the
prohibition on searches and seizures:
A person aggrieved by a search for or seizure of materials in violation of this
chapter shall have a civil cause of action for damages for such search or
seizure . . . against the United States . . . or against any other governmental
unit, all of which shall be liable for violations of this chapter by their officers
or employees while acting within the scope or under color of their office or
employment; and . . . against an officer or employee of a State who has
violated this chapter . . . .53

Any person aggrieved by a violation of the Act may sue for damages in
federal court.54 The legislative history suggests that to be aggrieved, a
person must possess the materials seized; people to whom the materials
relate, but who are not in possession of them, were not to be able to sue,55
though this may be a stricter reading of the text than courts apply in
practice.56 No matter the aggrieved party or amount of damages suffered, an
officer has a complete defense where he or she “had a reasonable good
faith belief” that the challenged conduct was lawful.57 Sparse case law has
emerged from this private right of action to guide courts’ and law
enforcement officers’ interpretations of the Act.
50

Id. § 2000aa(b)(3).
See Privacy Protection Act Hearing, supra note 27, at 6 (testimony of Sen. Max Baucus) (“[T]he
only question is how authorities should go about obtaining these materials . . . .”).
52
§ 2000aa(b)(4).
53
Id. § 2000aa-6(a).
54
Id. § 2000aa-6(h).
55
See S. REP. NO. 96-874, at 14 (1980) (“It is not the intent . . . to expand current law concerning
which persons have standing to bring an action for an unlawful search or seizure. Thus, . . . it would be
the person in possession of the materials, and not the party to whom the information related—the
criminal suspect—who would have standing to bring an action under these provisions.”). This is a
stricter reading of the text than courts apply in practice. See infra note 79 and accompanying text.
56
See, e.g., Guest v. Leis, 255 F.3d 325, 341 (6th Cir. 2001) (interpreting “aggrieved person” to
include users of an online bulletin board service who were not in physical possession of the material
seized by analogizing to provisions in the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA)); see also
infra note 79 and accompanying text.
57
§ 2000aa-6(b).
51
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C. Subsequent Interpretations of the Act
Courts have not had many occasions to interpret the Act. Few people
have brought suit under its provisions; still fewer cases have reached the
circuit courts. It is difficult to know the reason for the lack of suits. People
may not know of their eligibility to sue; law enforcement officers violating
the Act’s provisions are unlikely to simultaneously notify citizens of the
private right of action it confers. Most courts considering cases brought
under the Act identify an early reason to deny the claim amongst its
complex web of exceptions (especially the potent and sweeping suspect
exception),58 find no reason to believe that a person intended to disseminate
information to the public,59 or dismiss the claims on technical grounds.60
Those courts interpreting provisions of the Act have similarly avoided
identifying the outer contours of its protections. Instead, courts have
tailored their decisions to ancillary issues, such as the limits of protection
for certain kinds of publishers,61 the privacy rights of users of online
bulletin board systems,62 and the absence of required statutory procedures
for obtaining a warrant.63 Cases interpreting the Act have involved seizures
of computing equipment that stored information from people who ran
58

See, e.g., S.H.A.R.K. v. Metro Parks Serving Summit Cnty., 499 F.3d 553, 566–67 (6th Cir.
2007) (applying suspect exception); Pinnavaia v. FBI, 218 F. App’x 646, 647 (9th Cir. 2007) (affirming
a dismissal where the plaintiff conceded that he was a suspect when the challenged search took place);
Benson v. United States, Nos. 94-4182, 95-4061, 1995 WL 674615, at *2–3 (10th Cir. Nov. 13, 1995)
(affirming the district court’s holding that the Privacy Protection Act did not apply because the
plaintiffs were suspects and the information seized did not fall within the communication exception).
59
See, e.g., Teichberg v. Smith, 734 F. Supp. 2d 744, 752 (D. Minn. 2010) (granting summary
judgment in favor of law enforcement officials when the plaintiff, a photographer, failed to demonstrate
an issue of fact regarding whether the officers believed the photographer had a purpose to disseminate
information to the public); Lambert v. Polk Cnty., 723 F. Supp. 128, 132 (S.D. Iowa 1989) (noting, in
the context of a motion for a preliminary injunction, that there was no reason that officers should have
believed that a person who recorded a fight on video intended to distribute it to the public).
60
See, e.g., Mink v. Suthers, 482 F.3d 1244, 1257–58 (10th Cir. 2007) (affirming a dismissal for
failure to state a claim where the plaintiff failed to name the individuals who participated in the search
and seizure and failed to allege that the defendant district attorney “directed, controlled or participated
in the search or seizure”); United States v. Any & All Radio Station Transmission Equip., 218 F.3d 543,
551 (6th Cir. 2000) (affirming the district court in finding that radio transmission equipment is not
documentary or work product material subject to protection under the Act).
61
See Steve Jackson Games, Inc. v. U.S. Secret Serv., 816 F. Supp. 432, 440 (W.D. Tex. 1993),
aff’d, 36 F.3d 457 (5th Cir. 1994).
62
See Guest v. Leis, 255 F.3d 325, 341–42 (6th Cir. 2001) (holding that users of bulletin board
systems could be “aggrieved” under the Act so as to have a cause of action). Bulletin board systems
(BBSes) were early collaborative tools that allowed people to connect using a modem and phone line to
read and share messages, pictures, and other files. Modeled after corkboard bulletin boards, BBSes
were popular with hackers—including many committed to free speech online. See Bulletin-Board
Systems, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF NEW MEDIA 45–48 (Steve Jones ed., 2003) (calling the early 1990s the
“‘golden years’ of BBSing”); Bulletin Board Systems (BBS), in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPUTER SCIENCE
AND TECHNOLOGY 61–62 (Harry Henderson ed., rev. ed. 2009).
63
See Citicasters, Inc. v. McCaskill, 883 F. Supp. 1282, 1288 (W.D. Mo. 1995), rev’d, 89 F.3d
1350 (8th Cir. 1996).
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online bulletin board systems (BBSes), the precursors to modern online
communication services.64 In these cases, the courts could have explicated
the statute’s breadth as applied to such computing environments. However,
these cases do not help settle the Act’s ambiguities; one relies on narrow
facts to avoid questions posed by computers, and the other pairs
contradictory holdings on standing and commingled protected and
unprotected materials to deny much protection at all.
The first such case began when the Western District of Texas applied
the Act to a claim arising from the execution of a search warrant on Steve
Jackson Games, a publisher of books, magazines, and games, and the host
of the online bulletin board system Illuminati.65 The search warrant
stemmed from an incident in which a security director reported that a
computer hacker had accessed BellSouth’s 911 emergency system and
published the 911 program on a public online bulletin board. Following the
report, the Secret Service collected information that it thought tied the hack
to an employee of Steve Jackson Games.66 In the course of its investigation,
the Secret Service erroneously concluded that Steve Jackson Games’ BBS
also published criminal hacker materials.67 However, the Secret Service had
in fact mistaken a manual for a hacker-themed online role playing game to
be a “manual for computer crime.”68
Based on this erroneous belief, the Secret Service then obtained and
executed a search warrant on the corporate office of Steve Jackson Games.
Agents seized, amongst other things, the computer that hosted both the
bulletin board system and drafts of game-related materials meant for
publication.69 The Secret Service retained the seized material for over three
months, despite the company’s complaints that its publishing business was
interrupted.70 Afterward, Steve Jackson Games, Steve Jackson, and three
employees sued the Secret Service, alleging that the Secret Service had
violated the Privacy Protection Act in addition to two other statutory
provisions.71 The court acknowledged that the game publisher fell within
64

Julian Sanchez, The Prehistory of Cyberspace: How BBSes Paved the Way for the Web,
(Dec. 1, 2005, 12:00 AM), http://reason.com/archives/2005/12/01/the-prehistory-ofcyberspace.
65
See Steve Jackson Games, 816 F. Supp. at 434.
66
Id. at 435.
67
Id. at 436.
68
See Suzanne Stefanac, Dangerous Games, CAL. LAW., Oct. 1994, at 56, 60; see also SJ Games
vs. the Secret Service, STEVE JACKSON GAMES, http://www.sjgames.com/SS (last visited May 25, 2013)
(“They seemed to make no distinction between a discussion of futuristic credit fraud, using equipment
that doesn’t exist, and modern real-life credit card abuse. A repeated comment by the agents was ‘This
is real.’”).
69
Steve Jackson Games, 816 F. Supp. at 439–40.
70
Id. at 437.
71
Id. at 434. During the three months without the seized materials and equipment, Steve Jackson
Games claimed a total of over $150,000 in out-of-pocket expenses, lost sales, and lost profits. Id. at
438.
REASON.COM
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the scope of the Privacy Protection Act, noting that “[w]hile the content of
these publications are not similar to those of daily newspapers, news
magazines, or other publications,” the material was protected.72 Steve
Jackson Games won a damages award because the Secret Service violated
the Act by illegally seizing publishable documents.73 However, the court’s
ruling avoided actually deciding whether seizure of the computers storing
the e-mail and bulletin board systems violated the Act. Instead, the court
based its holding on the fact that the Secret Service refused to return
printed drafts of the book Gurps Cyberpunk, which was clearly classified
as work product under the Act.74 By resting its decision on facts tied to
physical materials, the court avoided resolving ambiguity over how the Act
protects the computing equipment also seized in the incident.
The second bulletin board system case, Guest v. Leis, more directly
confronted questions posed by computer searches.75 Guest arose from the
seizure of two bulletin board systems during an obscenity investigation by
the Hamilton County, Ohio, Regional Electronic Computer Intelligence
Task Force.76 Users of one system filed a class action on behalf of
subscribers alleging violations of the Privacy Protection Act, the First and
Fourth Amendments, the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, and
state law; alleging the same claims, the users, system operator, and
computer owner filed suit in relation to the other system.77 After the district
court granted summary judgment for the defendants in each case, the
plaintiffs appealed.
The Sixth Circuit found that the plaintiffs had standing because they
were “aggrieved”78 under the Privacy Protection Act, even though another
person may have been in possession of the materials seized.79 In so holding,
72

Id. at 434 n.1, 441.
Id. at 441, 443 (awarding $8781 in expenses and $42,259 in compensatory damages). The court
also awarded damages under the Stored Wire and Electronic Communications and Transactional
Records Access Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2712 (2006), for the seizure of a computer containing stored email, Steve Jackson Games, 816 F. Supp. at 442–43, and held that the Secret Service did not violate the
Federal Wiretap Act, id. at 442. See also Nicole Giallonardo, Casenote, Steve Jackson Games v. United
States Secret Service: The Government’s Unauthorized Seizure of Private E-Mail Warrants More than
the Fifth Circuit’s Slap on the Wrist, 14 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 179 (1995) (criticizing
the Fifth Circuit for upholding the district court’s ruling that there was no violation of the Wiretap Act).
74
Steve Jackson Games, 816 F. Supp. at 438–39.
75
See 255 F.3d 325 (6th Cir. 2001).
76
Id. at 329–30.
77
Id. at 330.
78
42 U.S.C. § 2000aa-6(a) (2006) (“A person aggrieved by a search for or seizure of materials in
violation of this chapter shall have a civil cause of action for damages . . . .”).
79
Guest, 255 F.3d at 341 (citing the Electronic Communications Protection Act, 18 U.S.C.
§ 2510(11) (2000) (defining “aggrieved person” as “a person who was a party to any intercepted wire,
oral, or electronic communication or a person against whom the interception was directed”)). The
appellants had argued that the users were in “joint possession” of the contents of the bulletin board
system because they “retained control over the messages they posted, having the ability to create, edit,
73
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the court rejected the argument that only the operator in possession of the
materials could have a cause of action, not mere users of the BBS.80 The
court then addressed the difficulties posed by computer searches, “a
situation unforeseen by the drafters.”81 The court noted that the Act does
not “explicitly address” liability for seizing “communicative material that is
technically difficult to separate” from evidence of a crime.82 To prevent
criminals from too easily “insulat[ing]” their criminal records and avoid
impeding law enforcement, the court held that officials could seize
protected materials commingled with unprotected evidence on a suspect’s
computer.83 The court warned police not to search protected materials, but
it failed to specify how a computer search should be conducted to comply
with such a limitation.84
The last notable challenge under the Act that reached the circuit level
explored warrant procedure. In Citicasters v. McCaskill, the Eighth Circuit
considered whether specific steps are required during a warrant application
when an exception to the Act’s no-search rule applies.85 Specifically, the
court addressed the question of who must decide if an exception applies
before a court issues a warrant for a search. Reversing the district court, the
Eighth Circuit held that a neutral magistrate need not decide the question.86
Furthermore, the court held that a warrant application need not disclose
applicable exceptions for it to issue.87 Congress’s silence informed the
court’s reasoning. The Act’s lack of a specified warrant procedure
indicated “congressional appreciation of the proper restraints of
federalism” with regard to state procedures governing how state law
enforcement officials acquire warrants.88 In dissent, Judge Bright disagreed
that the Act’s text provided a clear answer to the question.89 Finding that
the statute’s silence90 required consideration of the legislative history and

and send private messages or publish materials publicly.” Reply Brief of Appellants at 23, Guest, 255
F.3d 325 (No. 99-4115), 2000 WL 35462790.
80
See Guest, 255 F.3d at 341 (“Defendants argue that most of the plaintiffs lack standing in these
cases because only the operator of the bulletin board systems ‘possessed’ the materials at issue in these
cases.”).
81
Id.
82
Id. at 342.
83
Id.
84
See id.
85
89 F.3d 1350 (8th Cir. 1996).
86
See id. at 1355–56 (“Where Congress has provided a specific means for achieving its purpose,
we must . . . not embellish its legislative scheme with additional procedural innovations.”).
87
Id. at 1356.
88
Id. at 1355 n.6. The majority found the statutory silence to clearly and unambiguously indicate
the correct meaning of the statute and declined to consider legislative history. See id. at 1354–55.
89
Id. at 1357 (Bright, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
90
Id. at 1357–58.
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purpose,91 Judge Bright ultimately criticized the majority because “[a]fterthe-fact review can only punish violation, not prevent it.”92
These cases, while small in number, highlight the difficulties courts
face and avoidance strategies that they exercise when applying the Act to
modern environments rich in computing. The resulting law would veer
toward underprotection if courts followed these examples. Courts allow
warrants to be issued without requiring officials to specify what exceptions
to the Act exist. Seizure of commingled materials continues where
technology simply presents a difficult question and courts allow law
enforcement to seize laptops, phones, and servers. Broad changes in the
information industry have led to severely weakened statutory protection for
software companies and publishers whose products and communications
are entirely digital. Specifically, increasingly ubiquitous self-publishing
services and low barriers to entering the app economy equip more people
than ever before to readily disseminate information to the public—at which
point they should receive protection under the Act.
II. INTERVENING CHANGES IN THE INFORMATION INDUSTRY
Congress passed the Privacy Protection Act in an era that preceded
explosive growth in the computing and information industry.93 Since 1980,
two trends in particular typify the changes that have fundamentally altered
the landscape to which the Act may apply: mobile application services for
smartphones and online self-publishing. The transformation of publishing,
expansion of mobile service providers, and increasing ubiquity of content
pushed to subscribers’ mobile devices has led to a growth in app-driven
services.94 The Pew Internet and American Life Project estimates that by
May 2013, 56% of American adults had smartphones;95 usage has steadily
climbed.96 These include information-rich services from major multiplatform publishers97 as well as apps that may arguably serve to replace the
functions of traditional media such as books.98 This trend invites the

91

Id. at 1359–60.
Id. at 1360 (citing 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 4.3(a), at 459 (3d ed. 1996)).
93
See Eckenwiler, supra note 9.
94
See, e.g., Insights on the Emerging Mobile App Economy, NIELSEN (Sept. 14, 2010), http://www.
nielsen.com/us/en/newswire/2010/insights-on-the-emerging-mobile-app-economy.html.
95
See Device Ownership: Trend Data (Adults), PEW INTERNET, http://www.pewinternet.org/StaticPages/Trend-Data-(Adults)/Device-Ownership.aspx (last visited May 25, 2013).
96
See id. (showing smartphone adoption rates rising from 2011 to 2013).
97
See, e.g., The New York Times Mobile, N.Y. TIMES, http://www.nytimes.com/services/mobile/
apps (last visited May 25, 2013).
98
See, e.g., Julia Moskin, The Cooking App Comes Into Its Own, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2011, at D1
(suggesting that tablet-based cooking apps may diminish the use of printed cookbooks).
92
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question: are all information providers in this new “app economy”99
protected by the Act because they disseminate information to the public?
The transformation of communications has not been a one-way street.
While commercial information service providers have exploded,
individuals also increasingly publish online without their content being
mediated by a publisher.100 Online self-publishing is more than just an extra
option for those seeking to publish news, books, and other such resources.
For many, it is a core daily communication practice. Recent studies show
that 85% of adults and 95% of teens in the United States go online on at
least an occasional basis, a majority of whom post original content.101
Questions again emerge from this trend: does the Privacy Protection
Act protect all who communicate online, blogger and reporter alike?102
Furthermore, if the Act applies to these activities, which digital materials
garner its protection? Finally, which interests does the Act protect? In a
historical press context, the answers to these questions are relatively clear.
Privacy interests of confidential sources, reporters’ interests in publishing
their work, and a press operation’s overall interest in continuity would all
arguably trigger the motivation behind the Act.103 The modern press
context, employing many bloggers alongside copy editors and print

99

For a summary, see NIELSEN CO., THE STATE OF MOBILE APPS (2010), available at http://www.
nielsen.com/us/en/reports/2010/The-State-Of-Mobile-Apps.html.
100
See, e.g., Geoffrey A. Fowler & Jeffrey A. Trachtenberg, ‘Vanity’ Press Goes Digital, WALL
ST. J., June 3, 2010, at A1; Elinor Mills, Self-Publishing Made Easy Online, CNET NEWS (Jan. 9.
2007, 4:00 AM), http://news.cnet.com/Self-publishing-made-easy-online/2100-1038_3-6148342.html.
Readers curious to begin their own self-publishing operation should see Scott Steinberg, How To: SelfPublish Anything Online, MASHABLE (Aug. 5, 2010), http://mashable.com/2010/08/05/self-publishanything.
101
See Who’s Online: Internet User Demographics: Trend Data (Adults), PEW INTERNET, http://
pewinternet.org/Trend-Data-(Adults)/Whos-Online.aspx (last visited May 25, 2013); Teen Internet User
Demographics: Trend Data (Teens), PEW INTERNET, http://pewinternet.org/Trend-Data-(Teens)/WhosOnline.aspx (last visited May 25, 2013). While multiple news outlets have reported a decline in the
rates of people blogging, the decrease is usually described as offset by a corresponding increase in use
of social media or microblogging services such as Twitter. It does not indicate a decrease in online selfpublishing. See Verne G. Kopytoff, Blogs Wane as the Young Drift to Sites like Twitter, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 21, 2011, at B1; Ryan Singel, Blogging ‘Peaks,’ but Reports of Its Death Are Exaggerated,
WIRED (Dec. 16, 2010, 3:10 PM), http://www.wired.com/epicenter/2010/12/long-live-blogging.
102
Some argue that it does, but the question has not been definitively settled by the courts. See
Adam Cohen, The Media that Need Citizens: The First Amendment and the Fifth Estate, 85 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1, 47 (2011) (“The statute’s protection of ‘similar forms’ gives courts a textual hook for protecting
bloggers and other new media, but it is not clear how willing they are to do so.”). Cohen noted the 2010
search of a Gizmodo blogger as highlighting the salience of this ambiguity. Id. at 48; see also Lyrissa
Lidsky, Search of Gizmodo Journalist’s “Newsroom”/Bedroom: Federal Law, PRAWFSBLAWG
(Apr. 26, 2010, 9:53 PM), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2010/04/search-of-gizmodojournalists-newsroombedroom.html.
103
Each interest is indeed bound up in the simple observation that “the promise of nondisclosure is
necessary for many types of news gathering.” Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 731 (1972) (Stewart,
J., dissenting).
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foremen, shows how the line has blurred.104 For a blogger or app developer,
which interests are protected by the Act could mean the difference between
its protections being triggered or not. Operational continuity may not be an
issue for a blogger who has many options for where to connect to the
Internet and from what computing device she might publish. Protecting the
privacy of third-party customers could mean that the Act should prevent
searches and seizures of the devices of an app developer. The next Part
addresses ambiguities of the Act that emerge in light of these technological
transformations.
III. RESOLVING STATUTORY AMBIGUITIES TO INFORM ENFORCEMENT
In light of these changes, consistent enforcement of the Act demands
resolution of its ambiguities. First, given the ubiquity of personal
computing and the commonplace nature of self-publishing, we must
examine who is protected by the Act. Second, the rise in personal
computing leads to questions about what materials and information are
protected as work product or documentary materials. Moreover, how are
devices and equipment that house both protected and unprotected data
protected? Lastly, given the hazy boundaries between speech, privacy, and
the press, clarifying what interests the Act protects will help guide how it
should be enforced today.
To resolve these three ambiguities, the first step is, of course, to
consider whether the text of the Act itself demands a particular result.105 If
it does not, then a practical reasoning approach considers the cogency and
relative merits of other arguments.106 In addition to such traditional
104

See Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78, 84 (1st Cir. 2011) (“[C]hanges in technology and society
have made the lines between private citizen and journalist exceedingly difficult to draw. The
proliferation of electronic devices with video-recording capability means that many of our images of
current events come from bystanders with a ready cell phone or digital camera rather than a traditional
film crew, and news stories are now just as likely to be broken by a blogger at her computer as a
reporter at a major newspaper.”).
105
See, e.g., McNeill v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2218, 2221 (2011) (“As in all statutory
construction cases, we begin with ‘the language itself [and] the specific context in which that language
is used.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 341 (1997))); Dean
v. United States, 556 U.S. 568, 572 (2009) (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 431 (2000)).
Even scholars who promote using a more varied toolbox in statutory interpretation recognize that the
role of clear statutory text is paramount. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory
Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1479, 1496 (1987) (“In many cases, the text of the statute will
provide determinate answers . . . .”).
106
See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical
Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321, 322 n.3, 323 (1990) (“By ‘practical reason,’ we mean an approach
that eschews objectivist theories in favor of a mixture of inductive and deductive reasoning (similar to
the practice of the common law), seeking contextual justification for the best legal answer among the
potential alternatives.”). This Note follows Professors Eskridge and Frickey in avoiding a
foundationalist theory of statutory interpretation—that is, one prioritizing the text, intent, or purpose of
a statute above all other sources of interpretation. See id. at 321. The vast literature on the relative
merits of different schools of thought on statutory interpretation cannot be covered in full here, but see,
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approaches to statutory interpretation, Professor Daniel Solove’s theory of
the First Amendment as criminal procedure is a useful model for analyzing
the Act’s three ambiguities and evaluating how best to interpret it to
achieve its objectives.107
A. Solove’s First Amendment as Criminal Procedure
Professor Solove is critical of the existing relationship between the
First Amendment and criminal procedure. Finding modern Fourth and Fifth
Amendment jurisprudence insufficient to protect First Amendment
values,108 he proposes that the First Amendment “serve as an independent
source of [criminal] procedure,” similar to the Fourth Amendment, “to
protect expressive and associational activity from government information
gathering.”109 The fact that Solove’s theory has not been adopted as
constitutional law does not lessen its utility for exploring differing
interpretations of how this statute should operate.110 In fact, the principles
he sets out uniquely inform statutory construction of the Act given its roots
in First Amendment theory.111
Solove suggests a two-part inquiry to trigger First Amendment
protections. First, to determine whether the government action affects
activities that fall within the boundaries of the First Amendment, Solove
suggests inquiring into whether it interferes with expressive activity
protected by First Amendment values.112 First Amendment values arise
when communication, association, or other activities “implicate belief,
for example, WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., PHILIP P. FRICKEY & ELIZABETH GARRETT, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 689–846 (4th ed.
2007); KENT GREENAWALT, LEGISLATION: STATUTORY INTERPRETATION (1999); and ANTONIN
SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997).
107
See generally Daniel J. Solove, The First Amendment as Criminal Procedure, 82 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 112 (2007) (proposing that the First Amendment serve as an independent source of constitutional
criminal procedure).
108
See id. at 132–42 (chronicling the development of Fourth and Fifth Amendment protections and
the gradual lessening of protections related to the First Amendment afforded by Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence).
109
Id. at 151.
110
It may not be a viable position for a court to adopt post-Zurcher. Cf. City of Boerne v. Flores,
521 U.S. 507, 535–36 (1997) (“Our national experience teaches that the Constitution is preserved best
when each part of the Government respects both the Constitution and the proper actions and
determinations of the other branches. When the Court has interpreted the Constitution, it has acted
within the province of the Judicial Branch, which embraces the duty to say what the law is. When the
political branches of the Government act against the background of a judicial interpretation of the
Constitution already issued, it must be understood that in later cases and controversies the Court will
treat its precedents with the respect due them under settled principles, including stare decisis, and
contrary expectations must be disappointed.” (citation omitted)).
111
See, e.g., Privacy Protection Act Hearing, supra note 27, at 51 (prepared statement of Philip B.
Heymann, Assistant Att’y Gen. of the United States).
112
See Solove, supra note 107, at 153 (adopting the approach recommended in Robert Post,
Recuperating First Amendment Doctrine, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1249, 1255 (1995)).
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discourse, or relationships of a political, cultural, or religious nature.”113
Next, Solove suggests that First Amendment procedural protections are
warranted only where a “discernable ‘chilling effect’” is at risk.114 The risk
of a chilling effect is high when associational behavior is at issue or when a
person is writing, purchasing, or consuming information such as that in a
book or on a website.115 Where either of these two elements are present,
Solove would require (1) the government to demonstrate a significant
interest in the information sought and (2) that the manner of collection be
narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.116 Usually these requirements
would be met by the use of a warrant acquired after an affirmative showing
of probable cause.
First Amendment rights often operate as a defense in criminal
litigation.117 The Act’s private right of action thus presents an unusually
affirmative posture through which to analyze speech-related rights as they
intersect with the information-gathering procedures of law enforcement.
Solove’s framework has previously proven useful in analyzing
intersections between the First Amendment and statutory law governing
compelled disclosure.118 Here, it serves as an aid in sorting out the proper
(and ideal) scope of the Act, as well as the implications of competing
interpretations of the Act’s ambiguities.
B. Ambiguity One: The Protected Population
The first ambiguity is the question of to whom the Act applies. In light
of developments in online publishing,119 it is necessary to determine
whether the Act should reach so far as to protect all digital content
providers and people who publish online or whether the Act has a more
limited reach. The text of the Act is very broad, preventing the search or
seizure of “any work product materials” possessed by someone with a
“purpose to disseminate to the public” a “form of public
communication.”120 As long as what a person intends to disseminate is “a
newspaper, book, [or] broadcast” or falls under the broad umbrella of

113

See Solove, supra note 107, at 153.
Id. at 154.
115
See id. at 156.
116
See id. at 159, 161.
117
See Jennifer E. Laurin, Rights Translation and Remedial Disequilibration in Constitutional
Criminal Procedure, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1002, 1075 (2010).
118
See Thomas P. Crocker, The Political Fourth Amendment, 88 WASH. U. L. REV. 303, 345 n.238
(2010) (contrasting the First and Fourth Amendment models of protecting liberties); Katherine J.
Strandburg, Freedom of Association in a Networked World: First Amendment Regulation of Relational
Surveillance, 49 B.C. L. REV. 741, 795, 812, 814 (2008) (using Solove’s framework to analyze
associational interests implicated in searches and seizures).
119
See supra Part II.
120
42 U.S.C. § 2000aa(a) (2006).
114
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“similar form[s] of public communication,”121 a plain-text reading of the
statute applies. At first glance, both a blogger and an app developer appear
to be protected by a plain-text reading of the Act.
The legislative history supports this broad reading of the clause.
Assistant Attorney General Philip Heymann testified that the Act protects
everyone holding materials connected with “First Amendment activities,”
rather than solely the institutional press.122 The principle debate during
enactment was over scope;123 legislators focused on the singular question of
whether the Act should provide broad third-party nonsuspect protection124
or whether it was better to enact—as Congress ultimately did—a more
limited “First Amendment” bill.125 Bloggers and app developers post and
distribute content in the exercise of their speech rights and thus should be
protected under a First Amendment understanding of the Act.
Defining the protected population that broadly, though, risks
hampering law enforcement’s ability to search anyone with a home
computer or smartphone. A more limited construction of the statute could
be found by construing the meaning of “a newspaper, book, broadcast, or
other similar form of public communication” to be limited to information
produced by media institutions for broad public consumption.126
Furthermore, each is often a form of investment-backed contribution to a
sector of the information industry. Such a construction of the list may not
allow “similar form[s] of public communication”127 to encompass personal
communication, such as that of a noncommercial blogger. This distinction
may ultimately be insignificant or even unworkable, given the blurry line
between “news” as an investment-backed industry and the “news” broken
by self-publishing individuals.128
One might thus use this approach to limit the Act to protecting only a
narrow subset of those people involved in information dissemination, such
121

Id.
Privacy Protection Act Hearing, supra note 27, at 51 (prepared statement of Philip B.
Heymann, Assistant Att’y Gen. of the United States).
123
See Privacy Protection Act Hearing, supra note 27, at 5 (remarks of Sen. Birch Bayh) (listing
bills with varying subjects of protection); see also Erburu, supra note 28, at 163–73 (contrasting the
“press-only” and “third-party” bills considered by the Ninety-sixth Congress); Elizabeth H. Sillin, Note,
Citicasters v. McCaskill: Probing the Privacy Protection Act of 1980, 20 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 437,
470 (1998) (noting the lack of debate on required warrant procedures).
124
See Erburu, supra note 28, at 163–73 (describing the “third-party” bills considered by the
Ninety-sixth Congress).
125
See Privacy Protection Act Hearing, supra note 27, at 32–33 (testimony of Philip B. Heymann,
Assistant Att’y Gen. of the United States).
126
Noscitur a sociis instructs that “words grouped in a list should be given related meaning.” Dole
v. United Steelworkers of Am., 494 U.S. 26, 36 (1990) (quoting Massachusetts v. Morash, 490 U.S.
107, 114–15 (1989)).
127
42 U.S.C. § 2000aa (2006).
128
See Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78, 84 (1st Cir. 2011) (highlighting the blurry outer boundaries
of the news industry).
122
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as commercial publishing or broadcasting. However, construing statutory
language is not merely an exercise in ascertaining “the outer limits of [a
phrase’s] definitional possibilities.”129 Furthermore, should a court follow
the rationale of the Fifth Circuit in protecting a game publisher, the literal
words of the Act do not afford this limitation.130 Given the broad language
of the Act, the apparent congressional intent to protect activities ranging
the full extent of the First Amendment, and the weaknesses inherent in
forcing more limited constructions,131 the soundest reading of the Act seems
to extend as far as the First Amendment—the label removed from earlier
bills—to protect all people who communicate to the public.132
Solove offers a constitutionally based limiting principle. His focus on
expressive activities that implicate “belief, discourse, or relationships of a
political, cultural, or religious nature” offers a functional way of sorting
people who warrant more stringent protection from governmental intrusion
from those for whom government inquiry does not necessarily trigger First
Amendment restrictions.133 Under this limitation, the blogger would more
than likely warrant protection. The case is not so clear for the app
developer. If the content of the app is business information, such as stock
or finance quotes, one might conclude that the service does not implicate
“belief, discourse, or relationships.”134 If, however, the relevant app
publishes serial essays from an entrepreneurial Dickens-like developer,
Solove’s distinction may favor the app developer, too. Hinging protection
on the type of content trips up the distinction, as bloggers and app
developers alike are sure to confound the question of what constitutes
“belief, discourse, or relationships of a political, cultural, or religious
nature.”
129

Dolan v. U.S. Postal Serv., 546 U.S. 481, 486 (2006).
See Steve Jackson Games, Inc. v. U.S. Secret Serv., 816 F. Supp. 432, 434 n.1, 441 (W.D. Tex.
1993) (“While the content of [a game publisher’s] publications are not similar to those of daily
newspapers, news magazines, or other publications usually thought of by this Court as disseminating
information to the public, these products come within the literal language of the Privacy Protection
Act.”), aff’d, 36 F.3d 457 (5th Cir. 1994); see also Leslie G. Berkowitz, Computer Security and
Privacy: The Third Wave of Property Law, COLO. LAW., Feb. 2004, at 57, 64 (“[E]ven a BBS with
relatively few subscribers is a ‘publisher’ under the PPA, as long as the BBS and its files are used, as
they invariably are, for public communication.”).
131
Cf. FCC v. AT & T Inc., 131 S. Ct. 1177, 1184 (2011) (pointing out that AT & T failed to offer
a sound reason from the text or context of a statute to disregard the ordinary meaning of the phrase
“personal privacy”).
132
But see supra note 110 and accompanying text.
133
Solove, supra note 107, at 153 (noting that the Supreme Court has recognized certain
expression is “less central to, or not protected at all by, the First Amendment,” such as “[o]bscenity,
fighting words, and child pornography” (footnotes omitted)).
134
Using the nature of the expression to inform the level of protection afforded by the Act in this
way risks turning the original motivation for the Act—protecting news organizations—on its head. See
Privacy Protection Act Hearing, supra note 27, at 1–2 (statement of Sen. Edward M. Kennedy)
(describing the origins of the Act).
130
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Making finer distinctions based on First Amendment values, which
may themselves be contested, thus seems more problematic than a
straightforward, if broad, textual reading of the Act. The inquiry grows
more complex when we consider the range and hierarchy of digital
information that law enforcement officials seek to seize. The next section
examines which materials are protected under a broad reading of the Act
that reaches all First Amendment actors.
C. Ambiguity Two: The Protected Materials
Defining what materials are protected could also be a straightforward
task under the text of the Act, though a strict textual reading risks practical
problems for law enforcement.135 Two ambiguities cloud how the Act
protects digital materials. First, because digital files that are housed en
masse may rely collectively on services that run on a single server, it is
important to determine at what level of “container” the Act’s protections
operate: file, device, or both. If individual files are protected but not the
device on which they are stored, then the Act offers a very different level of
protection than if blanket container-level protection applies. Second, if only
file-level protection is offered, protecting files commingled with
unprotected files poses a challenge for law enforcement officials and the
courts to offer varied protection without eviscerating the Act.
The Act’s text focuses on form and format in defining protected
materials.136 By defining exceptions based on whether material sought is
work product or documentary materials, the statute’s text connotes the
press or any activity that similarly involves research, drafting, and
preparation for publication. Work product and documentary materials are
textually expansive for different reasons. Work product is not defined to
include only specific formats; therefore, print, electronic, and other types of
information all qualify. Likewise, by tying documentary materials to a
container-level definition—“cards, tapes, or discs”—it is possible that any
files stored on or in such a device are protected. However, the Sixth Circuit
in Guest already rejected enforcing such a blanket container-protection rule
for seizure of commingled protected and unprotected materials because it
would allow criminals to insulate their contraband files with protected
content.137 By adopting a rule disallowing protection for “commingled”
files on or in one digital container, the court framed its ruling as a solution
for when protected digital content is “technically difficult to separate from
the evidence of a crime whose seizure is authorized by a valid warrant.”138
135

See Guest v. Leis, 255 F.3d 325, 341–42 (6th Cir. 2001) (noting the difficultly of separating
unprotected digital contraband from protected files).
136
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa (2006); see also Anderson, supra note 14, at 436 (characterizing the
Act’s focus on form and format as “[t]ypical[]”).
137
Guest, 255 F.3d at 341–42.
138
Id. at 342.
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In the process, though, the Sixth Circuit ignored statutory text and
effectively eliminated protection for documentary materials where digital
containers store many files. In essence, the Sixth Circuit canceled out the
Act’s applicability in any situation in which law enforcement officials
encounter a disc, drive, or server.
The Guest decision is unsatisfying in its inconsistency. The court also
found that a user of a bulletin board—someone arguably not in physical
possession of the seized equipment and files—was “aggrieved” under the
Act.139 This step was generous in defining the potential protectable interest
and materials.140 The court juxtaposed this generosity with its unforgiving
imposition of the “commingling” rule,141 cutting off liability for an
improper search or seizure so long as contraband is alleged to be stored on
one of the “containers” seized.
The first step of the court’s analysis hints at an understanding of the
Act’s protections in line with Solove’s framework. After all, if one’s
personal records are in the possession of a third party, those records enjoy
little protection from the Fourth or Fifth Amendments even though they
implicate First Amendment values.142 As a quasi-constitutional “First
Amendment” statute, the Act should protect such materials. However, the
court’s second analytical move fails these interests by allowing all files to
be seized in the presence of a single file to which a statutory exception
applies. The understanding of protected digital materials most in line with
the text of the statute and broad First Amendment values would protect
both the container and individual files relating to a potential aggrieved
person.143 Making distinctions based on the quality of communication or
type of materials necessarily implicates the question of what interests are
protected by the Act. The next section considers what interests the Act
arguably serves to protect to justify this broad reading and identifies
statutory weaknesses that can be solved if not by interpreting the Act, then
by other mechanisms explored in Part IV.
D. Ambiguity Three: The Protected Interests
The Act does not announce policy objectives, nor does it include
congressional findings.144 However, its protections can be linked to more
than one conceptually distinct protectable interest. Taken literally, the Act
139

Id. at 341.
One critic argues that such a “vicarious concern for governmental misuse of privately collected
information[] seems an inferior concern.” Clemens P. Work, Whose Privacy?, 55 MONT. L. REV. 209,
231 (1994).
141
Guest, 255 F.3d at 342.
142
See Solove, supra note 107, at 125.
143
Cf. Fenno, supra note 11 (“[I]t appears facially that nearly everyone posting messages on the
Internet or with online services is covered by the Act.”).
144
See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000aa to 2000aa-12 (2006).
140
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protects a person who intends to disseminate information to the public from
searches or seizures of their work product or documentary materials.145 That
analysis is of little use to develop an informed resolution of the Act’s
ambiguities.146 Even so, protected interests may stem from the Act’s
purpose,147 so an inquiry into the motivation for the statute is relevant to
determine what (and whose) interests should be protected.
As a response to Zurcher, the Act’s presumptive purpose was to offer
procedural protections to those engaged in public communication.148
Implicit in the Act’s prohibition of searches and seizures is the assumption
that a search—even with a warrant’s probable cause requirement—was
inferior to a subpoena duces tecum to protect the interests that the drafters
of the statute had in mind.149 Specifically, there was concern in Congress
that the use of a warrant would allow the government to invade
nonsuspects’ privacy where voluntary compliance or a subpoena would
also work and be less intrusive.150 Moreover, a newspaper’s ability to
publish pending stories and attract confidential sources to help inform the
public in part depended on an operational continuity that would survive
interaction with law enforcement.
With this history in mind, the potential protected interests can be
sorted into protections for the person in possession of the materials or for a
third party to whom the materials relate whose privacy might also be
implicated in a search or seizure. Furthermore, the potential interests can be
classified as relating to categorical interests in speech, privacy, or
anonymity, as well as an interest in the operational continuity in
investment-backed information-dissemination operations.
One can identify more than one discrete relevant interest in the
category of privacy. A blogger might wish to remain anonymous or write

145

See id.
One commentator suggests a “clear statement” rule; “[i]n other words, unless Congress
expressly states in a statute that it intends to impose procedures on state and local governments, courts
should not read such implications into an act.” See Sillin, supra note 123, at 440 (considering whether
the Act mandated certain warrant procedures for state law enforcement officials). It would be unusual
for a clear statement rule to apply to a mere determination of the purpose, object, or policy of the Act or
an inquiry into its protected interest.
147
Cf. SEC v. C. M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 350–51 (1943) (noting that courts will
construe an act in conformity with its purpose and policy).
148
Cf. Sillin, supra note 123, at 440, 466–67 (“The dissent correctly stated that the overall
purpose . . . was to statutorily raise the standards of the Fourth Amendment to protect actions of those
engaged in First Amendment activities.”). But see Work, supra note 140, at 230 (“[T]he true privacy
interest protected in the Privacy Protection Act of 1980, limiting newsroom searches, is not
immediately obvious.” (emphasis added) (footnote omitted)).
149
See S. REP. NO. 96-874, at 4 (1980) (“The Committee believes that the search warrant procedure
in itself does not sufficiently protect the press and other innocent third parties and that legislation is
called for.”).
150
See id.
146

1460

107:1437 (2013)

Reviving Privacy Protection

under a pseudonym.151 Work product and documentary materials involve
privacy in two ways. If the Act relies on compliance with a subpoena rather
than allowing law enforcement officials to search, it ensures that the
“mental impressions” notated in work product are not seen by prying
eyes.152 Anonymous sources or whistleblowers are also less likely to be
chilled from bringing information forward to those that may publish them if
law enforcement is not allowed to rifle through it under false pretenses.153
Potential anonymous sources find comfort in knowing their identity will
not be revealed to law enforcement accidentally through a haphazard
execution of a search warrant and that the recipient of a subpoena has the
opportunity to challenge that subpoena in court.154 The opportunity to
respond to a request from law enforcement for information or documents,
such as that which attaches to a subpoena, allows the holder of such records
to attempt to prevent immediate breach of these types of privacy.
One can also identify multiple discrete relevant interests within free
speech. Prohibiting a search ensures that speech is not chilled by the fear of
sudden physical intrusions by law enforcement.155 Additionally, the Act’s
protections are tied to the public’s right to receive information.156 This logic
is especially strong if one interprets the Act to be primarily about the
institutional press, as some say that the press serves a structural role in our
constitutional system as an adversary to the Executive.157 One might also
151

See Solove, supra note 107, at 121, 145–46 (noting that government probing can deprive
speakers of the anonymity that is key to forthright expression and citing numerous cases that have
concluded that the First Amendment requires a heightened standard for an anonymous speaker’s
identity to be revealed).
152
See S. REP. NO. 96-874, at 10 (“For example, a reporter may prepare an article which his editor
decides should not be published; nonetheless, the reporter’s interview notes and draft of the article
would remain protected by the statute. Similarly, all of an author’s research notes would be protected,
although only part of the research was ultimately included in the published product.”).
153
See Work, supra note 140 (“Another interest arises from the forced release of information
obtained under a promise of confidentiality, possibly leading to a drying-up of sources and a
diminishing of the flow of information.”).
154
See Solove, supra note 107, at 162 (“[U]nlike with subpoenas, people cannot challenge warrants
beforehand.”). The extent of First Amendment protections for reporters is beyond the scope of this
Note. See generally 2 LEE LEVINE ET AL., NEWSGATHERING AND THE LAW § 16.06 (4th ed. 2011)
(discussing the lack of clarity in First Amendment privilege for reporters).
155
See S. REP. NO. 96-874, at 9 (“The Department of Justice . . . sought to avoid the chilling effects
of disruptive searches on the ability to obtain and publish information for all those who have a purpose
to disseminate information to the public.”).
156
See id. at 10 (“Key to the legislation is the concept of public communication. It is this flow of
information to the public which is central to the First Amendment, and which is highly vulnerable to the
effects of governmental intrusiveness.”); Solove, supra note 107, at 146–47 (“A corollary to the right to
free speech is the right to receive ideas.”).
157
See Potter Stewart, “Or of the Press,” 26 HASTINGS L.J. 631, 633 (1975) (“[T]he Free Press
guarantee is, in essence, a structural provision of the Constitution.”); Work, supra note 140, at 230
(“The strongest interest of the news media seems to be in not being a tool of law enforcement, an
objection grounded in the watchdog role of a free press that is institutionally antagonistic to, or at least
skeptical of, government.”).
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conceive of the Act as protecting one’s interest in being the first to
distribute protected materials in public communication. A Justice
Department attorney echoed this interest when he referred to “expressive
activity in utero,” summarizing the Act as protecting “things which are
intended to become public” rather than private facts.158 Lastly, the interests
above feed into the interest a person in the business of publishing has in
operational continuity—a major concern for app developers of whom
reliable delivery of information is expected.159 Given that the Act provides a
cause of action for damages, those who suffer economic losses are in a
better position to recover based on the loss of operational continuity.160
Solove’s distinction, between those actions that indicate “belief,
discourse, or relationships of a political, cultural, or religious nature” and
those that do not, best protects the continuous production of public
communication.161 An app developer who hosts her own content would
have a more difficult time distributing content were her server seized,
whereas a typical blogger could still post from a smartphone, a public
library terminal, or some alternate accommodation. The distinction,
however, might protect the expression of a noncommercial blogger over an
app developer who deals in minimally expressive content. Additionally,
especially if container-level protection is not offered to commingled digital
materials, we must determine whether the business interests of a
commercial app developer who wants to continue operating in the face of
law enforcement inquiry are indeed in the Act’s sights.162
Of course, without text upon which we might hang a way to cabin the
interests protected by the Act, a textual reading reaches broadly to each
interest described above. Such a broad reading may be justifiable in light of
the Act’s First Amendment roots, but it poses very real problems for
ongoing enforcement.

158

Eckenwiler, supra note 9, at 726. At the time of the address, Eckenwiler was an attorney with
the Justice Department’s Computer Crime Section of the Criminal Division.
159
Cf. Berkowitz, supra note 130, at 65 (calling the Act’s protection a property right in
documentary materials and work product).
160
See, e.g., Steve Jackson Games, Inc. v. U.S. Secret Serv., 816 F. Supp. 432, 434, 438 (W.D.
Tex. 1993) (noting that during the three months without its seized equipment, Steve Jackson Games
claimed a total of over $150,000 in out-of-pocket expenses, lost sales, and lost profits and awarding
$8781 in expenses and $42,259 in compensatory damages), aff’d, 36 F.3d 457 (5th Cir. 1994).
161
See Solove, supra note 107, at 153.
162
Much of the practical difference rests on whether the information provider hosts its own content
or not. It might thus be helpful to conceive of our archetypes as the do-it-yourself or commercial server
operator as opposed to a person reliant on cloud technology for continuity. Of course, this view of the
information industry also needs to take into account the interest in operational continuity that a cloud
service provider has for its digital materials.
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E. Problems with a Broad Reading of the Act
Unsurprisingly, a textual reading of a privacy statute enacted in 1980
carries multiple problems for enforcing the statute today. A broad reading
of the Act could problematically interfere with state and local law
enforcement’s ability to tailor how searches and seizures are accomplished
jurisdiction by jurisdiction.163 This concern ultimately proves too much.
The Privacy Protection Act is a quasi-constitutional “‘federal-first’
regulatory response[],”164 one of many analogous federal statutes defining
the government’s ability to seize information from members of the public.
As such, the Act is better characterized as showing the “importance of
federal leadership in information privacy problems.”165
A primary problem with such a broad reading of the Act comes down
to day-to-day practicality. A textual reading of the Act introduces the
potential problem of interfering with law enforcement officials’ ability to
ever permissibly search a computer that is connected to the Internet.
Indeed, “[a]lmost every search or seizure could be understood to have some
dimension that might involve a First Amendment activity because all
human interaction involves communication and association. In the end, the
First Amendment could swallow up all of criminal procedure.”166 The Sixth
Circuit seems to have had this issue in mind in Guest when developing its
commingling rule to lessen protection for digital files.167 Solove’s notion of
protecting information where First Amendment values are implicated might
be an aid in drawing a principled line, though it is not necessarily very
limiting.168 For instance, the blogger would certainly fall under the
protections of the Act because personal discourse surely implicates First
Amendment values.169 The First Amendment values of the audience of the
app developer would also be at issue, if not the app developer’s own
interests in commercial activity and speech. “[T]his flow of information to
the public . . . is central to the First Amendment, and . . . is highly
vulnerable to the effects of governmental intrusiveness.”170 Indeed, “[a]
corollary to the right to free speech is the right to receive ideas.”171
Without a broad reading of the Act or revision of the Act, more
jurisdictions could follow the lead of the Sixth Circuit and construe the
163

Cf. Schwartz, supra note 2, at 932 (expressing concern that federal preemption of privacy law
would block state sectoral experimentation).
164
Bellia, supra note 2, at 880, 882 (citing the Privacy Protection Act).
165
Id. at 882.
166
Solove, supra note 107, at 152 (footnote omitted).
167
See Guest v. Leis, 255 F.3d 325, 342 (6th Cir. 2001).
168
Solove, supra note 107, at 153.
169
Note too that if a blogger were the actual suspect of a crime (and not a crime exempted under
the Act), the Act would not offer protection. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa(a)(1) (2006).
170
S. REP. NO. 96-874, at 10 (1980).
171
Solove, supra note 107, at 146–47.
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statute in ways that eliminate its protections in the digital realm.
Alternative methods might be used to protect First Amendment actors from
the sudden intrusion of a search or seizure. Given the immense challenge in
updating the many out-of-date federal privacy statutes, these alternative
methods may be the best route toward shielding the various protected
interests we might associate with the Act. The next Part proposes both state
and federal options for such alternative methods of providing protection.
IV. ALTERNATIVE MECHANISMS TO PROTECT PRIVACY AND PUBLISHERS’
OPERATIONAL CONTINUITY
Should the Act indeed only represent a “vicarious concern” for the
privacy and speech interests of an app developer’s audience,172 a
compelling interest requirement for search and seizure in certain situations
would better protect the audience’s interests.173 Additionally, pending
federal privacy reform174 may provide an opportunity to integrate the Act
with other federal privacy law governing compelled disclosure and clarify
the interests protected. A compelling interest requirement and stringent ex
ante requirement would protect both privacy and the operational continuity
of someone in the practice of information dissemination.
A. Compelling Interest Requirements
Imposing a requirement that the government have a compelling
interest to access information offers a check on officials’ motivations for
demanding materials that implicate protected privacy and speech. Often
these compelling interest requirements originate in state law. For example,
Colorado’s constitution underlies the standard laid out in Tattered Cover,
Inc. v. City of Thornton.175 There, the Colorado Supreme Court held that the
state constitutional provision protecting freedom of speech protected the

172

See Work, supra note 140.
See, e.g., Tattered Cover, Inc. v. City of Thornton, 44 P.3d 1044 (Colo. 2002) (requiring a
heightened showing before law enforcement could demand the purchase records of a bookseller).
174
See, e.g., Electronic Communications Privacy Act Reform: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the
Constitution, Civil Rights & Civil Liberties of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. (2010); Alex
Howard, ECPA Reform: Why Digital Due Process Matters, O’REILLY RADAR (Sept. 23, 2010), http://
radar.oreilly.com/2010/09/ecpa-reform-why-digital-due-pr.html.
175
See 44 P.3d at 1047; COLO. CONST. art. II, § 10 (“[N]o law shall be passed impairing the
freedom of speech; . . . every person shall be free to speak, write or publish whatever he will on any
subject, being responsible for all abuse of that liberty . . . .”). If not for the ruling in Zurcher, the First
Amendment of the United States Constitution could conceivably be the basis of similar protections. See
U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech . . . .”); Martin
v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143 (1943) (“[The First Amendment] has broad scope . . . [and]
embraces the right to distribute literature and necessarily protects the right to receive it.” (citation
omitted)).
173
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circulation of books, as well as the right to speak freely.176 The court
imposed a two-prong balancing test to govern government inquiries into
the book-buying habits of the public. First, the government must have a
compelling need for the desired information.177 Second, the court must
balance the law enforcement officials’ need for the information against the
constitutional harms; motivations related to a book’s contents are
disfavored as implicating greater harm to free expression.178
Similarly, a California state statute requires notice, an opportunity to
respond, and a compelling government interest whenever law enforcement
officials seek to compel disclosure of user records from commercial book
services.179 This protection does not apply to voluntary disclosure of such
records or when exigent circumstances exist. The California requirement
combines the procedural protections of the Privacy Protection Act—
prohibiting a break-down-the-door surprise search—with the more
substantive protections of a compelling interest requirement to guard
readers’ interests.180
Another category of compelling interest requirements originates in
federal law. Solove points to multiple lower federal court holdings that a
compelling interest is necessary to support a subpoena for expressive
records,181 such as inquiring whether a customer purchased a graphically
sexual novel182 or a publication on evading taxes.183 These decisions could
form the basis of a stronger federal protection for reader or end-user

176

See Tattered Cover, 44 P.3d at 1051 (citing Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 64 n.6
(1963)).
177
See id. at 1057. Courts are to analyze whether the information may be obtained in another way.
Id. at 1059.
178
Id. at 1059.
179
See Reader Privacy Act of 2011, CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.90(c) (West Supp. 2013). Commercial
book services include bookstores as well as digital services such as Google Books or Amazon.com. See
SB 602 (Yee) Reader Privacy Act of 2011: Updating California Book Privacy Law, ACLU of N. Cal.,
available at http://www.aclunc.org/issues/technology/asset_upload_file991_9996.pdf.
180
See Press Release, Elec. Frontier Found., California’s Reader Privacy Act Signed into Law
(Oct. 3, 2011), available at https://www.eff.org/press/archives/2011/10/03 (quoting California State
Senator Leland Yee: “Individuals should be free to buy books without fear of government intrusion and
witch hunts. If law enforcement has reason to suspect wrongdoing, they should obtain a court order for
such information.”).
181
See Solove, supra note 107, at 147 & n.196 (citing In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Duces Tecum,
78 F.3d 1307, 1312 (8th Cir. 1996); A Grand Jury Witness v. United States (In re Grand Jury
Proceedings), 776 F.2d 1099, 1102–03 (2d Cir. 1985); Grandbouche v. United States (In re Grand
Subpoena to First Nat’l Bank), 701 F.2d 115, 119 (10th Cir. 1983)).
182
See In re Grand Jury Subpoena to Kramerbooks & Afterwords Inc., 26 Media L. Rep. (BNA)
1599, 1601 (D.D.C. 1998) (applying strict scrutiny to Independent Prosecutor Kenneth Starr’s request
regarding Monica Lewinsky’s book purchase records).
183
See In re Grand Jury Subpoena to Amazon.com Dated Aug. 7, 2006, 246 F.R.D. 570, 573
(W.D. Wis. 2007) (allowing the government to access only the records of individuals who voluntarily
chose to provide their information).
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privacy if made uniform nationwide.184 These decisions model how the
Privacy Protection Act might be supplemented with clearer substantive
protections for those who do not possess materials being sought by law
enforcement officers.
B. Federal Statutory Privacy Reform
Proposed changes to the federal privacy legislative scheme also create
an opportunity for the Act’s ambiguities to inform federal privacy reform.
While a thorough discussion of the movement to reform federal privacy
law is broader than the scope of this Note, it is useful to briefly consider
updates to the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA) as a
relevant example.185 Enacted as a forward-looking statute in 1986, ECPA
specifies standards for law enforcement officials to access electronic
communications and data, such as in stored communications and via
wiretaps, pen registers, and trap and trace devices.186 Parts of ECPA govern
law enforcement access to stored documents. Multiple organizations are
campaigning to update ECPA to require a warrant to access personal
information.187
Given the ambiguity of what materials are protected by the Privacy
Protection Act, coordinated reform of the Act alongside the more
frequently debated ECPA framework could harmonize the two. Debate
about ECPA reform has been a locus for advocacy for unification of federal
privacy law governing digital materials. Magistrate Judge Stephen Smith,
troubled by the lack of appellate review resulting from ECPA’s regime of
gag orders and sealed dockets, advocates for reform of the “structural
aspects” of ECPA.188 Specifically, he recommends (1) notifying targets of
searches and affected individuals such as “affected customers” and
“subscribers,” (2) “opening court files to the public,” and (3) “gathering
better surveillance data for Congress.”189
While the Privacy Protection Act does not govern the same electronic
materials that ECPA does, Judge Smith’s focus on structural aspects of
ECPA underscores the importance of the no-search rule imposed by the
Act. He focuses on the need for appellate review of ECPA surveillance
184

See Eric Robertston, Comment, A Fundamental Right to Read: Reader Privacy Protections in
the U.S. Constitution, 82 U. COLO. L. REV. 307, 329 (2011).
185
See Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.).
186
18 U.S.C. §§ 2511–2513 (2006); see also About the Issue, DIGITAL DUE PROCESS, http://
digitaldueprocess.org (last visited May 25, 2013).
187
See, e.g., Leslie Harris, Not Without a Warrant, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 27, 2011,
4:58 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/leslie-harris/online-privacy_b_983253.html; NOT WITHOUT
A WARRANT, supra note 3.
188
Stephen Wm. Smith, Gagged, Sealed & Delivered: Reforming ECPA’s Secret Docket, 6 HARV.
L. & POL’Y REV. 313, 314, 331 (2012).
189
Id. at 332–34.
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orders. In the context of the Privacy Protection Act, the structural features
of notice and opportunity to respond provide for judicial process that
oversees the government’s behavior. They also function as a mechanism to
stop the government prior to shutting down ancillary services that would be
collateral damage in an overbroad break-down-the-door search and seizure.
Not everyone agrees that notice is a proper solution. At least in the
surveillance context, Professor Orin Kerr thinks that remedies provide a
“better lever of statutory reform” than notice.190 He argues that a statutory
suppression remedy would leave targets of an investigation with a solution
akin to that available under the Fourth Amendment.191 Whatever its merits
in the surveillance space, Kerr’s argument cannot be successfully exported
to the context of the Privacy Protection Act. It does not go far enough to
protect the operational continuity interest one has when one’s own public
communication depends on continuous operation of servers, computers, or
other infrastructure that might be seized in violation of the Act. In fact, it
does not extend to nonsuspect third parties at all. The tension between the
ability to continue to publish and the Sixth Circuit’s commingling rule
warrants a structural solution that reinforces rather than weakens the Act’s
structural protections.
CONCLUSION
Unsurprisingly, the Privacy Protection Act of 1980 failed to anticipate
our technological present. Its ambiguities with regard to protected parties,
materials, and interests are disappointing given its original lofty goals of
protecting First Amendment activities and inchoate public communication.
Nevertheless, a textual reading of the statute affords expansive protections
to people who communicate information to the public, though it seems that
this broad protection remains unrealized in today’s enforcement context.
While the text literally bears this interpretation, this reading raises concerns
about the Act’s practical viability. And, while a subpoena duces tecum is
impliedly the Act’s preferred mechanism, it does not protect the privacy of
those not in possession of materials sought.
In light of these weaknesses, two avenues may strengthen, clarify, and
update the Act’s protections. A consistent federal compelling interest
standard would clarify the interests protected by the Act (those of the
possessor) and the First Amendment subpoena standard (those whose
information may be held by the possessor). Furthermore, reinforcement of
the Act’s no-search rule in federal privacy reform could help the federal
190

Orin Kerr, Notice and Opportunity to Challenge Evidence Collection Under the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act: What’s the Best Rule?, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (July 24, 2012,
2:52 AM), http://www.volokh.com/2012/07/24/should-ex-ante-court-order-requirements-also-comewith-notice-requirements-and-if-so-when.
191
See Orin S. Kerr, Lifting the “Fog” of Internet Surveillance: How a Suppression Remedy Would
Change Computer Crime Law, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 805, 807–08 (2003).

1467

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

privacy legislative scheme more clearly address both substantive
protections (through the probable cause warrant standard) as well as
procedural protections (through the prohibition on sudden searches and
seizures). The slogan “not without a warrant”192 may be satisfyingly
succinct, but one might imagine adding “and only if it is worth it” to help
federal criminal procedure effect a unified federal privacy scheme.
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